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### RFJXOW - PHELPS KASH

Semantics for Reasons is a book about what we mean when we talk about reasons. It not only brings together the theory of reasons and natural language semantics in original ways but also sketches out a litany of implications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. In their account of how the language of reasons works, Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp propose and defend a view called Question Under Discussion (QUD) Reasons Contextualism. They use this view to argue for a series of novel positions on the ontology of reasons, indexical facts, the reasons-to-be-rational debate, moral reasons, and the reasons-first approach.

Practical Reality is about the relation between the reason why we do things and the reasons why we should. It maintains that current philosophical orthodoxy bowdlerizes this relation, making it impossible to understand how anyone can act for a good reason. In order to understand this, Dancy claims, we have to abandon current conceptions of the reasons why we act (our 'motivating' reasons) as mental states of ourselves. Belief/desire explanations of action, or purely cognitive accounts in terms of beliefs alone, drive too great a wedge between the normative and the motivational. Instead, we have to understand a motivating reason as the sort of thing that could be a good reason: for instance, that the eggs are ready - this, rather than my believing that they are ready, must be my reason for taking them off the cooker. Most contemporary philosophers think that this view cannot be true. Dancy aims to demonstrate that things can be as he thinks they must be. By giving a fresh account of values and reasons, he finds a place for normativity in philosophy of mind and action, and strengthens the connection between these areas and ethics.

A Companion to the Philosophy of Action offers a comprehensive

overview of the issues and problems central to the philosophy of action. The first volume to survey the entire field of philosophy of action (the central issues and processes relating to human action-s) Brings together specially commissioned chapters from international experts Discusses a range of ideas and doctrines, including rationality, free will and determinism, virtuous action, criminal responsibility, Attribution Theory, and rational agency in evolutionary perspective Individual chapters also cover prominent historic figures from Plato to Ricoeur Can be approached as a complete narrative, but also serves as a work of reference Offers rich insights into an area of philosophical thought that has attracted thinkers since the time of the ancient Greeks

"This book concerns one of the most basic philosophical questions: the explanation of normativity in its many guises. It lays out succinctly the view of normativity that Raz has sought to develop over many decades and determines its contours through some of its applications. In a nutshell, it is the view that understanding normativity is understanding the roles and structures of normative reasons which, when they are reasons for actions, are based on values. The book aims also to clarify the ways in which normative reasons are made for rational beings like us. It brings the account of normativity to bear on many aspects of the lives of rational beings, most abstractly, their agency, more concretely their ability to form and maintain relationships, and live their lives as social beings with a sense of their identity"--

Reasons and Recognition brings together fourteen new papers on an array of topics from the many areas to which philosopher Thomas Scanlon has made path-breaking contributions, each of which develops a distinctive and independent position while critically engaging with central themes from Scanlon's own work in the area.

'The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity' contains 44

commissioned chapters on a wide range of topics, and will appeal to readers with an interest in ethics or epistemology. A diverse selection of substantive positions are defended by leading proponents of the views in question, and provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons as part of the study of ethics and as part of the study of epistemology (as well as focusing on reasons as part of the study of the philosophy of language and as part of the study of the philosophy of mind), the Handbook covers recent developments concerning the nature of normativity in general. A number of the contributions to the Handbook explicitly address such "metanormative" issues, bridging subfields as they do so. --

The Nature of International Law provides a comprehensive analytical account of international law within the prototype theory of concepts.

What are our reasons for acting? Morality purports to give us these reasons, and so do norms of prudence and the laws of society. The theory of practical reason assesses the authority of these potentially competing claims, and for this reason philosophers with a wide range of interests have converged on the topic of reasons for action. This volume contains eleven essays on practical reason by leading and emerging philosophers. Topics include the differences between practical and theoretical rationality, practical conditionals and the wide-scope ought, the explanation of action, the sources of reasons, and the relationship between morality and reasons for action. The volume will be essential reading for all philosophers interested in ethics and practical reason.

Reason and Value collects 15 new papers by leading contemporary philosophers on themes from the work of Joseph Raz. Raz has made major contributions in a wide range of areas, including jurisprudence, political philosophy, and the theory of practical reason;

but all of his work displays a deep engagement with central themes in moral philosophy. The subtlety and power of Raz's reflections on ethical topics make his writings a fertile source for anyone working in this area. Especially significant are his explorations of the connections between practical reason and the theory of value, which constitute a sustained and penetrating treatment of a set of issues at the very center of moral philosophy as it is practiced today. The contributors to the volume acknowledge the importance of Raz's contributions by engaging critically with his positions and offering independent perspectives on the topics that he has addressed. The volume aims both to honour Raz's accomplishments in the area of ethical theorizing, and to contribute to an enhanced appreciation of the significance of his work for the subject. Contributors: Michael E. Bratman, John Broome, Ruth Chang, Jonathan Dancy, Harry Frankfurt, Ulrike Heuer, Philip Pettit, Peter Railton, Donald H. Regan, T. M. Scanlon, Samuel Scheffler, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Michael Smith, Michael Stocker, Michael Thompson, R. Jay Wallace.

In recent decades normative reasons-considerations that count in favor of one thing or another-have come to the theoretical fore in ethics and epistemology. A major attraction of normative reasons is that they have weight or strength. Reasons are particular considerations that count in favor of actions or attitudes to some degree. This feature is attractive to theorists who want to explain more complex normative phenomena in terms of a notion that is weighted. This volume aims to provide the beginnings for a theory of weight. The fourteen new essays fall into three groups. One set of essays addresses questions about the nature of weight. Topics include the relations between reasons and conditions and modifiers, between reasons and other weighted notions such as commitments, and different models of the interaction of reasons. A second set of essays addresses substantive questions: questions about weight relevant to value-first, desire-first, evidence-first and other normative research programs. A third set of essays applies issues in the theory of weight to broader ethical debates. The book thus not only makes novel contributions to debates in ethics and epistemology about the nature of normative reasons and their weight, it also makes a strong case for the theoretical fruitfulness of the ideology of normative reasons.

Reason and Value collects fifteen brand-new papers by leading contemporary philosophers on themes from the moral philosophy

of Joseph Raz. The subtlety and power of Raz's reflections on ethical topics - including especially his explorations of the connections between practical reason and the theory of value - make his writings a fertile source for anyone working in this area. The volume honours Raz's accomplishments in the area of ethical theorizing, and will contribute to an enhanced appreciation of the significance of his work for the subject.

*Normativity and the Will* collects fourteen important papers on moral psychology and practical reason by R. Jay Wallace, one of the leading philosophers currently working in these areas. The papers explore the interpenetration of normative and psychological issues in a series of debates that lie at the heart of moral philosophy. Part I, Reason, Desire, and the Will, discusses the nexus linking normativity to motivation, including the relations between desire and reasons, the role of normative considerations in explanations of action, and the normative commitments involved in willing an end (such as the requirement to adopt the necessary means). Part II, Responsibility, Identification, and Emotion, looks at questions about the rational capacities presupposed by accountable agency and the psychic factors that both inhibit and enable identification with what we do. It includes an interpretation of the Nietzschean claim that resentment is among the sources of modern moral consciousness. Part III, Morality and Other Normative Domains, addresses the structure of moral reasons and moral motivation, and the relations between moral demands and other normative domains (including especially the requirements of living a meaningful human life). Wallace's treatments of these topics are at once sophisticated and engaging. Taken together, they constitute an advertisement for a distinctive way of pursuing issues in moral psychology and the theory of practical reason. The book articulates and defends a unified framework for thinking about those issues, while offering sustained critical discussions of other influential approaches (by philosophers such as Korsgaard, McDowell, Nietzsche, Raz, Scanlon, and Williams). It should be of interest to every serious student of moral philosophy.

We explain what people think and do by citing their reasons, but how do such explanations work, and what do they tell us about the nature of reality? Contemporary efforts to address these questions are often motivated by the worry that our ordinary conception of rationality contains a kernel of supernaturalism—a ghostly

presence that meditates on sensory messages and orchestrates behavior on the basis of its ethereal calculations. In shunning this otherworldly conception, contemporary philosophers have focused on the project of "naturalizing" the mind, viewing it as a kind of machine that converts sensory input and bodily impulse into thought and action. Eric Marcus rejects this choice between physicalism and supernaturalism as false and defends a third way. He argues that philosophers have failed to take seriously the idea that rational explanations postulate a distinctive sort of causation—rational causation. Rational explanations do not reveal the same sorts of causal connections that explanations in the natural sciences do. Rather, rational causation draws on the theoretical and practical inferential abilities of human beings. Marcus defends this position against a wide array of physicalist arguments that have captivated philosophers of mind for decades. Along the way he provides novel views on, for example, the difference between rational and nonrational animals and the distinction between states and events.

Hans Kelsen is commonly considered to be among the founding fathers of modern legal philosophy. Despite Kelsen's prominence as a legal theorist, his political theory has so far been mostly overlooked. This book argues that Kelsen's legal theory, the Pure Theory of Law, needs to be read in the context of Kelsen's political theory. It offers the first comprehensive interpretation of the Pure Theory that makes systematic use of Kelsen's conception of the rule of law, of his theory of democracy, his defense of constitutional review, and his views on international law. Once it is read in the context of Kelsen's political works, Kelsen's analysis of legal normativity provides us with a notion of political legitimacy that is distinct from any comprehensive and contestable theory of justice. It shows how members of pluralist societies can reasonably acknowledge the binding nature of law, even where its content does not fully accord with their own substantive views of the requirements of justice, provided it is created in accordance with an ideal of fair arbitration amongst social groups. This result leads to a fundamental re-evaluation of the Pure Theory of Law. The theory is best understood as an attempt to find a middle ground between natural law and legal positivism. Later positivist legal theorists inspired by Kelsen's work failed to appreciate the political-theoretical context of the Pure Theory and turned to a narrow instrumentalism about the functions of law. The perspective on

Kelsen offered in this book aims to reconnect positivist legal thought with normative political theory.

How do mental events such as choices and decisions lead to physical action? The problem of mental causation is one of the most important and intriguing philosophical issues of our time and has been at the centre of debates in the philosophy of mind for the past fifty years. In opposition to the recent wave of reductionist theories, this book argues that it is possible to account for mental causation within a nonreductive framework as it adopts a broadly Davidsonian approach to mental causation: reasons cause actions because they are identical to physical events. This work then defends this approach from the frequently raised criticism that it entails epiphenomenalism - the inefficacy of the mental. Moreover, *Mental Causation* moves beyond Davidson's views by reconsidering the question of whether reasons causally explain actions, arguing in opposition to Davidson, that explanations appealing to reasons represent a distinct category of explanation from causal explanation. Essential reading for anyone interested in debates about mental causation, this is an excellent text for senior undergraduates, graduate students, and professional philosophers.

The contributions to this edited volume engage with John Gardner's philosophical work on private law. The content is divided into three parts. The first part gathers contributions on general theoretical issues that bear upon private law. The second part is concerned with Gardner's well-known views on responding to wrongs and the justification of reparative duties - an issue that spans all of private law. The third part turns to theoretical issues within particular areas of private law. Its focus is Gardner's focus: tort law, but it also includes chapters on contract law and equity. The primary aim of *Private Law and Practical Reason* is to facilitate a critical assessment of the private law thinking of one of the most important legal philosophers of the last fifty years. Gardner's contributions to private law theory are recognised to be amongst the most significant and philosophically rich. This work assembles a group of contributors with diverse theoretical commitments, many of whom have not directly engaged previously with Gardner's work, and is intended to act as a reference point for central debates in private law theory, such as the role of moral duties, the justification of reparative obligations, and, more broadly, the role of reasons in private law.

The "Guise of the Good" thesis - the view that desire, intention, or

action) always aims at the good - has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. The book brings together work on various issues related to this thesis both from contemporary and historical perspectives.

This volume focuses on constitutional ratification, the procedure in which a draft constitution is submitted by its creators to the people or their representatives in an up or down vote determining implementation. Ratification is increasingly common and routinely recommended by experts. Nonetheless, it is neither neutral nor inevitable. Constitutions can be made without it and when it is used it has significant effects. This raises the central question of the book: should ratification be recommended? Put another way: is there a reason for treating the procedure as a default for the constitution-making process? Surprisingly, these questions are rarely asked. The procedure's worth is assumed, not demonstrated, while ratification is generally overlooked in the literature. In fact, this is the first sustained study of ratification. To address these oversights, this book defines ratification and its types, explains the procedure's effects, conceptual origins, and history, and then concentrates on finding reasons for its use. Specifically, it builds up and analyzes the three most likely normative justifications. These urge the implementation of ratification because the procedure: enables the constituent power to make its constitution; fosters representation during constitution-making; or helps create a legitimate constitution. Ultimately, these justifications are found wanting, leading to the conclusion that ratification lacks a convincing, context-independent justification. Thus, until new arguments are developed, experts should not give recommendations for ratification as a matter of course, practitioners should not reach for it uncritically, and more generally one should avoid the blanket application of concepts from democratic theory to extraordinary contexts such as constitution-making.

What are our duties or rights? How should we act? What are we responsible for? Joseph Raz examines the philosophical issues underlying these everyday questions. He explores the nature of normativity--the reasoning behind certain beliefs and emotions about how we should behave--and offers a novel account of responsibility.

Eighteen of the world's most eminent philosophers of recent years tackle central questions of philosophy. They discuss mind, morality, freedom, identity, religion, politics, and philosophy itself. This

anthology of lectures from the Royal Institute of Philosophy offers a fascinating sampler of philosophy at its best.

Ralph Wedgwood gives a general account of what it is for states of mind and processes of thought to count as rational. Whether you are thinking rationally depends purely on what is going on in your mind, but rational thinking is a means to the goal of getting things right in your thinking, by believing the truth or making good choices.

*Normativity and Naturalism in the Social Sciences* engages with a central debate within the philosophy of social science: whether social scientific explanation necessitates an appeal to norms, and if so, whether appeals to normativity can be rendered "scientific." This collection brings together contributions from a diverse group of philosophers who explore a broad but thematically unified set of questions, many of which stem from an ongoing debate between Stephen Turner and Joseph Rouse (both contributors to this volume) on the role of naturalism in the philosophy of the social sciences. Informed by recent developments in both philosophy and the social sciences, this volume will set the benchmark for contemporary discussions about normativity and naturalism. This collection will be relevant to philosophers of social science, philosophers interested in the rule following and metaphysics of normativity, and theoretically oriented social scientists.

These previously unpublished essays present the newest developments in the thought of philosophers working on action and its explanation, focusing on a wide range of interlocking issues relating to agency, deliberation, motivation, mental causation, teleology, interpretive explanation and the ontology of actions and their reasons.

Love has been the subject of much fascination. It is indeed one of those things which elude us in many ways. The long-lasting disagreement over love's nature is unsurprising. In light of this, a piecemeal approach to love is in order. Instead of asking what love is down the line, we might need to investigate its various features and its connection to other things. *The Rationality of Love* addresses the question whether love belongs, paradoxically enough, to the realm of reason, whether love belongs to the class of responses, such as belief and action, that admit of norms of justification and rationality. Are there normative reasons to love someone? Can it be an appropriate or fitting response to an individual? Can it be rational? Or is love, like perceptual experiences, sensations

and urges, the sort of thing we just have and for which we cannot be rationally criticizable? Hichem Naar provides a sustained defense of the rationality of love. There are reasons to love others, reasons provided by the unique value of each individual. This will in turn rule out popular accounts of love which deny love's rationality and vindicate those accounts that make room for it. Drawing on various domains of philosophical inquiry such as the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of normativity, and epistemology, Naar provides a careful assessment of the various positions in the debate over reasons for love and develops his own answer to the normative question about love.

This book takes up a central question in jurisprudence: What difference can law make to normative reasons relevant to our actions? Following a critical examination of two competing models, an exclusionary model and a weighing model, Gur proposes a third way that aims to capture the strengths of both of these models while avoiding their pitfalls.

Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In *Reasons without Rationalism*, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, *Reasons without Rationalism* is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind.

Is the government ever justified in restricting offensive speech? This question has become particularly important in relation to communications which offend religious sensibilities. It is often argued that insulting a person's beliefs is tantamount to disre-

specting the believer; that insults are a form of hatred or intolerance; that the right to religious freedom includes a more specific right not to be insulted in one's beliefs; that religious minorities have a particularly strong claim to be protected from offence; and that censorship of offensive speech is necessary for the prevention of social disorder and violence. None of those arguments is convincing. Drawing on law and philosophy, this book argues that there is no moral right to be protected from offence and that, while freedom of religion is an important right that grounds negative and positive obligations for the state, it is unpersuasive to interpret constitutional and human rights provisions as including a right not to be caused offence. Rather, we have good reasons to think of public discourse as a space for the expression of all viewpoints about the ethical life, including those which some will find offensive. This is necessary to sustain a society's capacity for self-reflection and change.

"The last fifty years or more of ethical theory have been preoccupied by a turn to reasons. The vocabulary of reasons has become a common currency not only in ethics, but in epistemology, action theory, and many related areas. It is now common, for example, to see central theses such as evidentialism in epistemology and egalitarianism in political philosophy formulated in terms of reasons. And some have even claimed that the vocabulary of reasons is so useful precisely because reasons have analytical and explanatory priority over other normative concepts - that reasons in that sense come first. *Reasons First* systematically explores both the benefits and burdens of the hypothesis that reasons do indeed come first in normative theory, against the conjecture that theorizing in both ethics and epistemology can only be hampered by neglect of the other. Bringing two decades of work on reasons in both ethics and epistemology to bear, Mark Schroeder argues that some of the most important challenges to the idea that reasons could come first are themselves the source of some of the most obstinate puzzles in epistemology - about how perceptual experience could provide evidence about the world, and about what can make evidence sufficient to justify belief. And he shows that along with moral worth, one of the very best cases for the fundamental explanatory power of reasons in normative theory actually comes from knowledge"--

Normative reasons have become a popular theoretical tool in recent decades. One helpful feature of normative reasons is their

weight. The fourteen new essays in this book theorize about many different aspects of weight. Topics range from foundational issues to applications of weight in debates across philosophy.

Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework in terms of which we seek to understand each other. Millar defends a conception according to which normativity is linked to reasons. On this basis he examines the structure of certain normative commitments incurred by having propositional attitudes. Controversially, he argues that ascriptions of beliefs and intentions in and of themselves attribute normative commitments and that this has implications for the psychology of believing and intending. Indeed, all propositional attitudes of the sort we ascribe to people have a normative dimension, since possessing the concepts that the attitudes implicate is of its very nature commitment-incurring. The ramifications of these views for our understanding of people is explored. Millar offers illuminating discussions of reasons for belief and reasons for action; the explanation of beliefs and actions in terms of the subject's reasons; the idea that simulation has a key role in understanding people; and the limits of explanation in terms of propositional attitudes. He compares and contrasts the commitments incurred by propositional attitudes with those incurred by participating in practices, arguing that the former should not be assimilated to the latter. *Understanding People* will be of great interest to most philosophers of mind, as well as to those working on practical and theoretical reasoning.

The book illustrates the concept of action in three different contexts - the justification of actions, people's life history, and pragmatism. Because of its comprehensive view, this volume marks a departure from the atomistic approach of action theory. This in itself raises a number of questions, which the ten contributors to this volume deal with in an instructive manner.

This book focuses on the problems of rules, rule-following and normativity as discussed within the areas of analytic philosophy, linguistics, logic and legal theory. Divided into four parts, the volume covers topics in general analytic philosophy, analytic legal theory, legal interpretation and argumentation, logic as well as AI& Law area of research. It discusses, inter alia, "Kripkenstein's" sceptical argument against rule-following and normativity of meaning, the role of neuroscience in explaining the phenomenon

of normativity, conventionalism in philosophy of law, normativity of rules of interpretation, some formal approaches towards rules and normativity as well as the problem of defeasibility of rules. The aim of the book is to provide an interdisciplinary approach to an inquiry into the questions concerning rules, rule-following and normativity.

Legal theory, political sciences, sociology, philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence: there are many approaches to legal argumentation. Each of them provides specific insights into highly complex phenomena. Different disciplines, but also different traditions in disciplines (e.g. analytical and continental traditions in philosophy) find here a rare occasion to meet. The present book contains contributions, both historical and thematic, from leading researchers in several of the most important approaches to legal rationality. One of the main issues is the relation between logic and law: the way logic is actually used in law, but also the way logic can make law explicit. An outstanding group of philosophers, logicians and jurists try to meet this issue. The book is more than a collection of papers. However different their respective conceptual tools may be, the authors share a common conception: legal argumentation is a specific argumentation context.

This volume is a state-of-the-art survey of the psychology of reasoning, based around, and in tribute to, one of the field's most eminent figures: Jonathan St B.T. Evans. In this collection of cutting edge research, Evans' collaborators and colleagues review a wide range of important and developing areas of inquiry. These include biases in thinking, probabilistic and causal reasoning, people's use of 'if' sentences in arguments, the dual-process theory of thought, and the nature of human rationality. These foundational issues are examined from various angles and finally integrated in a concluding panoramic chapter written by Evans himself. The eighteen chapters, all written by leading international researchers, combine state-of-the-art research with investigation into the most fundamental questions surrounding human mental life, such as: What is the architecture of the human mind? Are humans rational, and what is the nature of this rationality? How do we think hypothetically? The Science of Reason offers a unique combination of breadth, depth and integrative vision, making it an indispensable resource for researchers and students of human reason.

Charles Peirce, the founder of Pragmatism, is not known for having developed a normative and ethical theory. His remarks on

ethics and normativity are scattered and sparse. There is nonetheless increasing interest in developing these aspects of Peirce's thought. Peirce takes logic to fall under the normative sciences and the open question, as I take it here, is whether the normativity Peirce takes to be present in logic and inquiry can be generalized to form an ethical theory. Most broadly Peirce takes an ethical theory to be a general guide for conduct - it is a guide for conduct in thought, action or behavior more generally, and in feeling. The question becomes whether Peirce's theory of logic and inquiry can offer a more general guide for conduct. Peirce's writings on the classification of the normative sciences, as well as his 'Philosophy and the Conduct of Life,' have led many scholars to answer in the negative. I think that an ethical theory nonetheless arises from within Peirce's writings on logic and inquiry. In this dissertation, I lay the foundation for this alternative approach by showing how Peirce's theory of logic and inquiry serves as a guide for behavior. The basis for the argument can be briefly summarized. Peirce's logic and theory of inquiry provide normative standards that apply to changes in belief. Peirce takes the formation of a belief to be an inference, and Peirce's logic and theory of inquiry give us the tools (at least the thought goes) to evaluate these inferences. Peirce also supposes a connection between belief and action. According to Peirce the meaning of a belief is the mode of action the belief establishes. The conjunction of these two claims suggests how a more general guide for conduct can be motivated from within Peirce's writings. It suggests that for the Peircean pragmatist the normative standards that apply to belief formation apply directly to established modes of action. This dissertation offers a systematic development of this connection. I show how Peirce takes normative standards to apply to belief, and then show how these standards correspond directly to changes in an individual's behavior. I begin with a characterization of Peircean pragmatism based on what I call the Continuity of Explanation. The Continuity of Explanation is the commitment that every judgment entails consequences for action that are accountable to scientific investigation. The Continuity of Explanation captures what I take to be the core aspects of Peirce's theory of judgment and inquiry. It follows from situating the role the pragmatic maxim serves in regulating scientific inquiry and distilling this maxim through Peirce's theory of judgment. I go on to demonstrate how the Continuity of Explanation serves as a guide for developing

more reasonable behavior. The characterization of Peircean pragmatism in terms of the Continuity of Explanation yields further advantages. It provides a unified framework to view Peirce's metaphysics, offers a straightforward account of Peirce's theory of action, and can account for Peirce's increasing emphasis on the development of concrete reasonableness.

Metaethics is the inquiry into the nature of morality (or ethics, I use the words 'morality', 'morals', and 'ethics' as synonyms). When we pass moral judgements, what kind of claims are we then making? I speak of this as the semantic metaethical question. Are there moral facts, to be discovered by us and existing independently of our thoughts and conceptualisation? I speak of this as the ontological or metaphysical metaethical question. And, if there are, can we know about them; and, if we can, how do we get this kind of knowledge? I speak of this as the epistemic metaethical question. All these metaethical questions, the semantic, the ontological, and the epistemic ones, are raised and discussed in this book, but they are not the core questions raised. I have been more concerned with another kind of questions, which deserve to be called metaethical as well: what are the problems of morality? Are there many different moral questions, or, do they all, in the final analysis, reduce to only a few, or perhaps just one? This question is of special importance to a non-naturalist objectivist and realist like the present author, who believes that we do make truth-claims when we pass moral judgements and who believes that there is a truth in these matters so that we must face the possibility that even our most cherished moral judgements may be false.

Based on a symposium held at New College, Oxford in September 2008.

Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking. Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought. Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us. Gives an account of what reasons are and argues that the connection between rationality and reasons is much less close than many philo-

sophers have thought Contains rigorous new accounts of oughts including ownedoughts, agent-relative reasons, the logic of requirements,instrumental rationality, the role of normativity in reasoning,following a rule, the correctness of reasoning, the connectionsbetween intentions and beliefs, and much else. Offers a new answer to the 'motivation question' ofhow a normative belief motivates an action.

Sometimes our intentions and beliefs exhibit a structure that proves us to be irrational. The Normativity of Rationality is concerned with the question of whether we ought to avoid such irrationality. Benjamin Kiesewetter defends the normativity of rationality by presenting a new solution to the problems that arise from the common assumption that we ought to be rational. The argument touches upon many other topics in the theory of normativi-

ty, such as the form and the content of rational requirements, the preconditions of criticism, and the function of reasons in deliberation and advice. Drawing on an extensive and careful assessment of the problems discussed in the literature, Kiesewetter provides a detailed defence of a reason-response conception of rationality, a novel, evidence-relative account of reasons, and an explanation of structural irrationality in terms of these accounts.