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TQA486 - KODY GARZA

Kuwait has been pivotal to the decades-long U.S. effort to secure the Persian Gulf region because of its consistent cooperation with U.S. military operations in the region and its key location in the northern Gulf. Kuwait and the United States have a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), under which the United States maintains over 13,000 military personnel in country and prepositions military equipment to project power in the region. Only Germany, Japan, and South Korea host more U.S. troops than does Kuwait, which has hosted the operational command center for U.S.-led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) that has combatted the Islamic State since 2014. Kuwait is a partner not only of the United States but also of the other hereditary monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman). Kuwait is participating militarily in the Saudi-led coalition that is trying to defeat the Shia "Houthi" rebel movement in Yemen, but Kuwait tends to favor mediation of regional issues over the use of military force. Kuwait has sought to resolve the intra-GCC rift that erupted in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia and the UAE moved to isolate Qatar. Kuwait has refrained from intervening in Syria's civil war, instead hosting donor conferences for victims of the Syrian civil conflict, Iraq's recovery from the Islamic State challenge, and the effects of regional conflict on Jordan's economy. Kuwait has not followed some of the other GCC states in building quiet ties to the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel. Kuwait generally supports U.S. efforts to counter Iran and has periodically arrested Kuwaiti Shias that the government says are spying for Iran, but it also engages Iran at high levels. U.S. government reports have praised steps by Kuwait to counter the financing of terrorism, but reports persist that wealthy Kuwaitis are still able to donate to extreme Islamist factions in the region. Kuwait has consistently engaged the post-Saddam governments in Baghdad in part to prevent any repeat of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Experts have long assessed Kuwait's political system as a potential regional model for its successful incorporation of secular and Islamist political factions, both Shia and Sunni. However, since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, Kuwait has followed other GCC states in incarcerating and revoking the citizenship of social media and other critics. Kuwait's political stability has not been in question but long-standing parliamentary opposition to the ruling Sabah family's political dominance has in recent years included visible public pressure for political and economic reform. Parliamentary elections in July 2013 produced a National Assembly amenable to working with the ruling family, but the subsequent elections held in November 2016 returned to the body Islamist and liberal opponents of the Sabah family who held sway in earlier assemblies. Kuwait has increased

its efforts to curb trafficking in persons over the past few years. Years of political paralysis contributed to economic stagnation relative to Kuwait's more economically vibrant Gulf neighbors such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Like the other GCC states, Kuwait has struggled with reduced income from oil exports during 2014-2018. Kuwait receives negligible amounts of U.S. foreign assistance, and has offset some of the costs of U.S. operations in the region since Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

This book assesses the dynamics of Kuwaiti foreign policy since 1961 and explores the role of Kuwait as a small state in international politics. It analyzes the impact of ideology, religion, and value systems on Kuwaiti foreign policy as well as the impact of domestic forces on political actors.

Political & government system, government and administrative structure, foreign, domestic policy, international activity and more. Updated annually

This book provides readers with a fresh analysis of the Arab state by using a new theoretical framework: hybrid sovereignty. The author examines various areas to make his argument: citizenship, the issue of minorities, electoral engineering, the failure of central rule, tribalism, and the lack of impersonal bureaucratic mechanism.

After being granted full independence in 1961, Kuwait began its tumultuous relationship with the US. This book sets out to investigate this alliance within the frameworks of a 'small state' and 'influence', and in particular under the US presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush. The political, diplomatic and military aspects are examined which have both stalled and enhanced the bilateral relationship at different times and events. The relationship between the two countries has not always been a straightforward one. Kuwait, overshadowed by its bigger neighbour Saudi Arabia, was regarded as a derivative interest by the US and its role within the region more often than not underestimated. Shedding new light on this key political alliance, the book details how this uneasy relationship evolved while Kuwait maintained its independent foreign policy, which contradicted US national interest. Illuminating and informative, it is essential reading for anyone with an interest in Middle East politics and international relations.

This south-to-north perspective, using the prism of foreign policy analysis, fills a gap in the literature on Euro-Middle Eastern relations. It also adds to the study of International Relations by throwing light on wider questions.

Rapid social, economic, and political change is endemic to the Middle East and is often more revolutionary than evolutionary in nature. In many ways, the entire political landscape of the Middle East

has been transformed in the past decade in the realm of both international relations and domestic politics: The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the cold war, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait have all had a profound effect on relations among states within the region and between those states and countries outside the region. In this revised edition, Long and Reich provide comprehensive and up-to-date analyses of many critical contemporary events and issues. The contributors explain how Desert Storm isolated Iraq and brought Syria back into the mainstream of Arab politics, contributing to the revival of the Arab-Israeli peace process. They also show how the return of a Labor government in Israel has allowed the peace process to go forward. Evaluating the economic costs of the Kuwait war and the continuing oil glut, the authors find that resulting changes in the domestic economies of the oil-producing states have created additional pressures for social and political change. The most profound change in government and politics, however, is the rise of Islam as the idiom of political discourse among moderates as well as extremists.

The first ever sourcebook on U.S.-Kurdish relations, *The Kurdish Question in U.S. Foreign Policy* is a unique and timely work. It not only reproduces the full text of over 325 of the most important U.S. government documents dealing with the Kurdish question, but also provides both a guide to U.S. government sources for locating subsequently published materials and an annotated list of over 200 primary and secondary sources. Thorough and instructive, the book serves as an invaluable research tool and published national archive of U.S. government documents on U.S.-Kurdish issues. U.S. government information is crucial for any research or reading on American involvement in Kurdish affairs. This sourcebook alleviates some of the problems associated with using U.S. government documents, such as lack of access and difficulty in identifying relevant sources. It educates users on where and how to find relevant U.S. government information on the Kurds as well as other stateless nations. Detailed subject, author, and title indices are also included to allow easy access and identification of key materials. The first ever documentary sourcebook and annotated bibliography on U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds, *The Kurdish Question in U.S. Foreign Policy* should appeal to all academic, special, and public libraries, as well as among government and news agencies.

Saudi Arabia in the Balance brings together today's leading scholars in the field to investigate the domestic, regional, and international affairs of a Kingdom whose policies have so far eluded the outside world. With the passing of King Fahd and the installation of King Abdullah, a contemporary understanding of Saudi Arabia is essential as the Kingdom enters a new era of leadership and particularly when many Saudis themselves are increasingly debating, and actively shaping, the future direction of domestic and foreign affairs. Each of the essays, framed in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, offers a systematic perspective into the country's political and economic realities as well as the tension between its regional and global roles. Important topics covered include U.S. and Saudi relations; Saudi oil policy; the Islamist threat to the monarchy regime; educational opportunities; the domestic rise of liberal opposition; economic reform; the role of the royal family; and the country's foreign relations in a changing international world. Contributors: Paul Aarts, Madawi Al-Rasheed, Rachel Bronson, Iris Glosemeyer, Steffen Hertog, Yossi Kostiner, Stéphane Lacroix, Giacomo Luciani, Monica Malik, Roel Meijer, Tim Niblock, Gerd Nonneman, Michaela Prokop, Abdulaziz Sager, Guido Steinberg

Master's Thesis from the year 2004 in the subject Sociology - Political Sociology, Majorities, Minori-

ties, grade: Distinction, The University of Western Ontario (Department of Sociology), language: English, abstract: The purpose of this thesis is to discover the extent to which governments possess the capacity to influence public opinion. It argues that the United States government initiated and directed a social control campaign during both the 1991 and 2003 wars with Iraq in order to mobilize public opinion in support of their foreign policy objectives. To this end, the United States government, in conjunction with powerful interest groups, is seen to possess the capacity to influence the content of the mass media in order to disseminate and promote justifications for war that contain emotion-provoking elements. During both wars, the justifications presented to the American public produced a negative emotional response to Saddam Hussein and in the process created a foreign threat that appeared to be immediate. It is concluded that these social control campaigns restricted the American public's access to reliable information, thereby obstructing their ability to participate in their nation's political process.

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Scholars of international relations tend to prefer one model or another in explaining the foreign policy behavior of governments. Steve Yetiv, however, advocates an approach that applies five familiar models: rational actor, cognitive, domestic politics, groupthink, and bureaucratic politics. Drawing on the widest set of primary sources and interviews with key actors to date, he applies each of these models to the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis and to the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003. Probing the strengths and shortcomings of each model in explaining how and why the United States decided to proceed with the Persian Gulf War, he shows that all models (with the exception of the government politics model) contribute in some way to our understanding of the event. No one model provides the best explanation, but when all five are used, a fuller and more complete understanding emerges. In the case of the Gulf War, Yetiv demonstrates the limits of models that presume rational decision-making as well as the crucial importance of using various perspectives. Drawing partly on the Gulf War case, he also develops innovative theories about when groupthink can actually produce a positive outcome and about the conditions under which government politics will likely be avoided. He shows that the best explanations for government behavior ultimately integrate empirical insights yielded from both international and domestic theory, which scholars have often seen as analytically separate. With its use of the Persian Gulf crisis as a teachable case study and coverage of the more recent Iraq war, *Explaining Foreign Policy* will be of interest to students and scholars of foreign policy, international relations, and related fields.

Kuwait remains pivotal to U.S. efforts to secure the Persian Gulf region because of its consistent cooperation with U.S. strategy and military operations in the region and its location in the northern Gulf. Kuwait and the United States have a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), under which the United States maintains over 13,000 military personnel in country and prepositioned military equipment in Kuwait to project power in the region. Only Germany, Japan, and South Korea host more U.S. troops than does Kuwait. Kuwait usually acts in concert not only with the United States but also with allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman). However, Kuwait tends to favor mediation of regional issues over commitments of military force. Kuwait is the lead Gulf mediator of the intra-GCC rift that erupted in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain moved to isolate Qatar. Kuwait hosts the operational command center

for U.S.-led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) that is combating the Islamic State. The Kuwaiti government has not intervened in Syria's civil war, instead hosting donor conferences for civilian victims of the conflict. However, the government has failed to prevent wealthy Kuwaitis from raising funds for extreme Islamist rebels in Syria or elsewhere. Kuwait is participating militarily in the Saudi-led coalition that is trying to defeat the Shiite "Houthi" rebel movement in Yemen, but has also worked to forge a diplomatic solution to that conflict. Kuwait has supported U.S. efforts to contain Iran and has periodically arrested Kuwaiti Shiites that the government says are spying for Iran, but it also engages Iran at high levels. As part of this engagement, in February 2017, Iran's President Hassan Rouhani visited Kuwait (and Oman). Experts had long assessed Kuwait's political system as a regional model for its successful incorporation of secular and Islamist political factions, both Shiite and Sunni. However, Kuwait's reputation for political pluralism has been tarnished in recent years as it has followed other GCC states in incarcerating and revoking the citizenship of social media critics for "insulting the Amir." Kuwait's political stability was also put in question during 2006-2013, initially manifesting as parliamentary opposition to the ruling Sabah family's political dominance but later broadening to visible public pressure for political reform. Parliamentary elections in July 2013 produced a National Assembly amenable to working with the ruling family, but the subsequent elections held in November 2016 returned to the body Islamist and liberal opponents of the Sabah family who held sway in earlier Assemblies. Assembly oppositionist challenges to government policy led to a cabinet resignation in early November 2017, although the cabinet appointed in December 2017 does not differ much from the previous cabinet on key policy questions. On the other hand, Kuwait has been increasing its efforts to curb trafficking in persons over the past few years. Years of political paralysis contributed to economic stagnation relative to Kuwait's more economically vibrant Gulf neighbors such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Like the other GCC states, Kuwait is also struggling with the consequences of the decline in oil prices from 2014 levels. Kuwait receives negligible amounts of U.S. foreign assistance, and has offset some of the costs of U.S. operations in the region since Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

With recent upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa, the eighth edition of *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa* has been thoroughly revised to provide a necessary, comprehensive and current examination of the domestic politics and foreign policies of this crucial region. A newly expanded introduction provides students with a comparative and thematic overview of the region, from its political regimes and electoral institutions to its economic and social concerns. Each chapter, written by an invited specialist, uses a common framework to explore the historical background, social and political environment, political structure and dynamics, and foreign policy of a country. Chapters are augmented by a country map, a box providing key facts, and an annotated bibliography summarizing the major literature. The eighth edition provides vital new considerations of the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the ongoing sectarian violence and rise of ISIS, and the growth of social forces like youth movements and women's rights groups. In addition, the inclusion of six new contributors brings fresh perspectives, ensuring that *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa* remains an essential guide to the region's political landscape.

By the time of Barack Obama's inauguration as the 44th president of the United States, he had already developed an ambitious foreign policy vision. By his own account, he sought to bend the arc

of history toward greater justice, freedom, and peace; within a year he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, largely for that promise. In *Bending History*, Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael O'Hanlon measure Obama not only against the record of his predecessors and the immediate challenges of the day, but also against his own soaring rhetoric and inspiring goals. *Bending History* assesses the considerable accomplishments as well as the failures and seeks to explain what has happened. Obama's best work has been on major and pressing foreign policy challenges—counterterrorism policy, including the daring raid that eliminated Osama bin Laden; the "reset" with Russia; managing the increasingly significant relationship with China; and handling the rogue states of Iran and North Korea. Policy on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however, has reflected serious flaws in both strategy and execution. Afghanistan policy has been plagued by inconsistent messaging and teamwork. On important "softer" security issues—from energy and climate policy to problems in Africa and Mexico—the record is mixed. As for his early aspiration to reshape the international order, according greater roles and responsibilities to rising powers, Obama's efforts have been well-conceived but of limited effectiveness. On issues of secondary importance, Obama has been disciplined in avoiding fruitless disputes (as with Chavez in Venezuela and Castro in Cuba) and insisting that others take the lead (as with Qaddafi in Libya). Notwithstanding several missteps, he has generally managed well the complex challenges of the Arab awakenings, striving to strike the right balance between U.S. values and interests. The authors see Obama's foreign policy to date as a triumph of discipline and realism over ideology. He has been neither the transformative beacon his devotees have wanted, nor the weak apologist for America that his critics allege. They conclude that his grand strategy for promoting American interests in a tumultuous world may only now be emerging, and may yet be curtailed by conflict with Iran. Most of all, they argue that he or his successor will have to embrace U.S. economic renewal as the core foreign policy and national security challenge of the future.

China's foreign policy in the Arab world is important because it reflects China's general foreign policy. In this study, first published in 1981, the author draws upon a wealth of previously unpublished and inaccessible material to analyse Chinese attitudes in three cases: the two Arab liberation movements, the Palestine Resistance Movement and the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Oman, and the established and independent State of Kuwait. Since the Arab liberation movements played a significant political role within their fields of operation, it was necessary for China to decide whether these movements did actually fit in with Chinese foreign policy objectives. Dr Behbehani's analysis of these two case studies provides the basis for a discussion of whether China's motives in supporting the liberation movements are theoretical or purely practical. China's support for Kuwait's political internal continuity is related to the stability of the whole Gulf region. The author analyses Chinese support for Kuwait and the surrounding conservative states on two main bases, political and economic, in the form of trade. It is through these channels, particularly the economic one, that China has sought to establish itself in the Gulf and the Arabian peninsula.

Kuwait has been pivotal to U.S. efforts to secure the Persian Gulf region because of its willingness to cooperate with U.S. strategy and military operations in the region, its location close to both Iran and Iraq, and its role as the object of past Iraqi aggression. Kuwait arguably became even more central to the U.S. ability to project power in the northern Persian Gulf when all U.S. combat troops left Iraq

in 2011. Kuwait has helped Iraq reintegrate into the Arab world; it is supporting U.S. efforts to contain Iranian power and enforce Iran sanctions; and it is procuring missile defense technology that furthers the U.S. goal of a GCC-wide missile defense network. Still, as demonstrated by the Amir of Kuwait's May 2014 visit to Iran, Kuwait maintains relatively normal economic and political relations with Iran so as not to provoke the Islamic Republic. Kuwait receives no U.S. foreign assistance and has instead been a donor of both cash and in-kind support to U.S. operations in the region since Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Kuwait is supporting U.S.-led efforts to defeat the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria by placing its airbases and other military facilities at the disposal of the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition—even though Kuwait is not itself participating in coalition military operations against the group. Kuwait hosts the forward command center for Operation Inherent Resolve that is attempting to degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State organization. Yet, U.S.-Kuwait differences have emerged over what U.S. officials say is Kuwait's inability to stanch the flow of private Kuwaiti funds to extremist Islamist groups fighting in Syria. Kuwait's government supports the Sunni-led rebellion in Syria with humanitarian aid only. On other regional issues, Kuwait generally acts in partnership with its allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In March 2011, Kuwait sent naval forces as a largely symbolic participation in GCC military intervention to help Bahrain's government suppress an uprising by the majority Shiite population. Kuwait's leadership, along with that of Saudi Arabia and UAE, sees Muslim Brotherhood-related organizations as a domestic threat, and all three countries supported the Egyptian military's July 2013 removal of elected president and senior Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammad Morsi from power. Kuwait has tended to defer to GCC leader Saudi Arabia and other GCC states in offering proposals to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Domestically, Kuwait's political system was in turmoil during 2006-2013, initially manifesting as parliamentary opposition to Sabah family political dominance but later broadening to visible public unrest in 2012-2013. Disputes over the ruling family's power and privileges produced repeated constitutional dissolutions of the all-elected National Assembly and new elections, the latest of which were held on July 27, 2013. The July 2013 elections produced a pro-government Assembly more amenable to working with the ruling family, ushering in a period of renewed legislative and governmental action on long-standing issues and an end to most public protest. Yet, the ruling family has not necessarily eliminated the causes of the unrest. Kuwait remains a relatively wealthy society, where most citizens do not want to risk their economic well-being to try to bring about the downfall of Al Sabah rule. The government has reduced unrest by implementing budgets replete with subsidies and salary increases, and undertaking some repressive measures such as imprisoning or revoking the citizenship of social media critics for "insulting the Amir." These measures have tarnished Kuwait's reputation as the most politically progressive of the GCC states. The years of political paralysis also have contributed to economic stagnation relative to Kuwait's more economically vibrant Gulf neighbors such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

During the 1991 Gulf War, pundits and experts scrambled unsuccessfully to explain Iraq's "claim" to Kuwait. In a lucid and measured account of a complex historical and geographic drama that culminated in Operation Desert Storm, David Finnie elucidates the long Kuwaiti-Iraqi border dispute and lays Saddam Hussein's dubious claim to rest. He also raises larger questions about European colonialism and about the creation of new nation-states in the Middle East in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-

turies. Finnie vividly portrays how arbitrary the drawing of frontiers can be, and how they come to serve internal, regional, and international rivalries and ambitions. This history begins in the eighteenth century, when Kuwait was first settled by nomads from the Arabian desert. Finnie describes the country's growing prosperity under a merchant oligarchy, then shows how the Kuwaitis, seeking British protection from the sprawling Ottoman Empire, came to serve England's imperial strategy. He details the ways in which Britain parlayed its mandatory control of Iraq and its protectorate over Kuwait to curb the larger nation's ambitions and to ensure Kuwait's independence under British auspices. A fresh look at British diplomatic documents reveals how Whitehall covered its tracks, heading off the Iraqis, obfuscating League of Nations proceedings, and confounding scholars and researchers down to the present day. Pursuing his story through Britain's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and Iraq's 1963 recognition of Kuwait's boundaries, Finnie examines the U.N. post-war measures to secure the frontier in the face of Iraq's continuing pressure for better access to Gulf waters.

With the powerful words that marked her long and distinguished career, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick explores where America has gone wrong—and raises lingering questions about what perils tomorrow might hold. In *Making War to Keep Peace*, the former U.S. Ambassador to the UN traces the course of diplomatic initiatives and armed conflict in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo to illuminate the dangerous shift from the first Bush administration's ambitious vision of a New World Order to the over-ambitious nation-building efforts of the Clinton administration. Kirkpatrick questions when, how, and why the United States should resort to military solutions—especially in light of the George W. Bush administration's challenging war in Iraq, about which Kirkpatrick shares her "grave reservations" for the first time.

Kuwait, unlike most of its neighbours, has a well-established national identity and a long history as a nation, dating back to the eighteenth century. In this book, first published in 1992, Dr. Jill Crystal focuses on two recurring themes in Kuwaiti history: one, the preservation of a sense of community in the face of radical economic, social and political transformations; the second, internal rivalry over the conventions governing relations among members of the community. Crystal skilfully weaves these themes into a broad profile of Kuwait, analysing the nation's transformation from a pre-oil to an oil economy; its social structure and composition, including the country's tribal roots and key divisions involving class, gender and immigrant labour; political tensions resulting from the nation's sudden wealth and the accompanying changes in social structure; and its relations with other countries in the Gulf and the Middle East.

The United States' relationship with Saudi Arabia has been one of the cornerstones of U.S. policy in the Middle East for decades. Despite their substantial differences in history, culture, and governance, the two countries have generally agreed on important political and economic issues and have often relied on each other to secure mutual aims. The 1990-91 Gulf War is perhaps the most obvious example, but their ongoing cooperation on maintaining regional stability, moderating the global oil market, and pursuing terrorists should not be downplayed. Yet for all the relationship's importance, it is increasingly imperiled by mistrust and misunderstanding. One major question is Saudi Arabia's stability. In this Council Special Report, sponsored by the Center for Preventive Action, F. Gregory Gause III first explores the foundations of Riyadh's present stability and potential sources of future unrest. It is difficult not to notice that Saudi Arabia avoided significant upheaval during the political

uprisings that swept the Middle East in 2011, despite sharing many of the social and economic problems of Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. But unlike their counterparts in Cairo, Sanaa, and Tripoli, Riyadh's leadership was able to maintain order in large part by increasing public spending on housing and salaries, relying on loyal and well-equipped security forces, and utilizing its extensive patronage networks. The divisions within the political opposition also helped the government's cause. This is not to say that Gause believes that the stability of the House of Saud is assured. He points out that the top heirs to the throne are elderly and the potential for disorderly squabbling may increase as a new generation enters the line of succession. Moreover, the population is growing quickly, and there is little reason to believe that oil will forever be able to buy social tranquility. Perhaps most important, Gause argues, the leadership's response to the 2011 uprisings did little to forestall future crises; an opportunity for manageable political reform was mostly lost. Turning to the regional situation, Gause finds it no less complex. Saudi Arabia has wielded considerable influence with its neighbors through its vast oil reserves, its quiet financial and political support for allies, and the ideological influence of salafism, the austere interpretation of Islam that is perhaps Riyadh's most controversial export. For all its wealth and religious influence, however, Saudi Arabia's recent record has been less than successful. It was unable to counter Iranian influence in post-Saddam Iraq, it could not prevent Hezbollah taking power in Lebanon, and its ongoing efforts to reconcile Hamas and the Palestinian Authority have come to naught. The U.S.-Saudi relationship has, unsurprisingly, been affected by these and other challenges, including Saudi unhappiness with Washington's decision to distance

itself from Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, the lack of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and Iran. For its part, the United States is unhappy with the Saudi intervention in Bahrain and Saudi support for radical Islamists around the region and the world. The two traditional anchors of the U.S.-Saudi relationship—the Cold War and U.S. operation of Riyadh's oil fields—are, Gause notes, no longer factors. It is no wonder, he contends, that the relationship is strained when problems are myriad and the old foundations of the informal alliance are gone. It would be far better, Gause argues, to acknowledge that the two countries can no longer expect to act in close concert under such conditions. He recommends that the United States reimagine the relationship as simply transactional, based on cooperation when interests—rather than habit—dictate. Prioritizing those interests will therefore be critical. Rather than pressuring Riyadh for domestic political reform, or asking it to reduce global oil prices, Gause recommends that the United States spend its political capital where it really matters: on maintaining regional security, dismantling terrorist networks, and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There have been few relationships more important to the United States than that with Saudi Arabia, and it is vital that, as it enters a new phase, the expectations and priorities of both countries are clear. In Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East, Gause effectively assesses the challenges and opportunities facing Saudi Arabia and makes a compelling argument for a more modest, businesslike relationship between Washington and Riyadh that better reflects modern realities. As the United States begins reassessing its commitments in the Greater Middle East, this report offers a clear vision for a more limited—but perhaps more appropriate and sustainable—future partnership.